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Abstract 
It is the objective of this paper to identify the determinants that led to the increase in worldwide foreign 
direct investment during the 1990s. The paper also addresses the question whether these factors 
influenced exports differently. Therefore, using data from 22 countries reporting to the OECD, gravity 
models for bilateral FDI stocks/flows and exports are estimated, first in a cross-section setting for 1999 
and then as a panel data set for the period 1991-2001. In order to control for EU-specific effects, a 
distinction is made between intra-EU25 observations and observations outside the EU25 area. 
Regressions are repeated with exports as a dependent variable in order to elaborate how far 
determinants of trade flows are identical or how far they differ. In the panel context, the results show 
that a change in total market size is an important aspect that leads both FDI and exports in the same 
direction. Relative market size influences only exports significantly. Stock market booms boost FDI 
but not exports. Political indicators and exchange rate changes suggest that exports are demand-driven 
while FDI is supply-driven. Overall, FDI and exports tended to flow relatively less abundantly to 
distant countries than to nearby countries over the period under consideration. This supports the idea of 
a complementary relationship between investment and trade. However, this trend is reversed for 
exports within the EU25 area. 
 
Keywords:  foreign direct investment and international trade; multinational firms; 
models with panel data. 
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1 Introduction 
The 1980s and 1990s saw an unprecedented rise in worldwide foreign direct investment (FDI). Cross-
border investment grew even faster than world GDP and international trade flows (Markusen 1995). 
Data from the World Investment Report (UNCTAD 2001) show that FDI increased on average by 20% 
or more in 94 countries for the period 1986-2000. The most active region in the world in this respect 
was the EU15 area. The group of EU15 countries undertook and received the lion's share of worldwide 
FDI when investment between current member states is included. Outward FDI stocks – actual foreign 
assets held by companies of a donor country – rose sixteen-fold from just over 200 billion US$ in 1980 
to about 3500 billion US$ in 2000 for the EU15 countries. The corresponding inward FDI stocks – 
assets of foreign companies as seen by the recipient country – grew in the same period fourteen-fold 
from again roughly 200 billion US$ to 2900 billion US$. For comparison, foreign direct investment 
originating in or directed to the United States increased during these 20 years by about half that 
amount. The situation was more uni-directional for developing countries. They were, as a group, 
important recipients of FDI in the past. Outward FDI stocks of developing countries, however, were 
very low until the end of the 1990s. Moreover, regions gained in varying degrees from incoming FDI: 
most capital from Western countries went to South-east Asia and, to a lesser degree, to Latin America. 
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Sub-Saharan Africa was more or less excluded from this development. Emerging markets like China, 
India and Brazil have themselves become important investors in recent years. 
As Appendix 1 illustrates, FDI flows grew rapidly in the 1990s, as did FDI stocks. The strong increase 
in worldwide FDI flows at that time was mainly driven by the growing FDI activity of Western 
European countries. Investment that took place in Central and Eastern Europe has often been stressed 
in this context, and a number of authors have concentrated on the explanation of FDI flows to these 
countries and their impacts (e.g. Brenton et al. 1999, Bevan and Estrin 2004, Campos and Kinoshita 
2002). However, data of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) show 
that, during the 1990s, Western European countries invested far more between themselves than in 
states of the former Warsaw Pact (OECD 2003). There is one major difference between worldwide FDI 
flows and stocks: while total FDI stocks today are larger than ever, FDI flows – financial transactions 
involved in foreign investment – collapsed after 2000 and have only recently begun to recover.  
This study aims to analyse which macroeconomic factors led to the enormous rise (and subsequent fall) 
of FDI over the period 1991-2001. Apart from management studies that look into specific product 
markets, empirical research on FDI can be roughly divided into two approaches. When asking why 
some countries or sectors within a country receive more investment from abroad than others, some 
economists explain FDI by using fundamental characteristics like market size, factor-price differences 
and trade costs (e.g. Eaton and Tamura 1994, Graham 1997, Brainard 1997). They typically apply a 
cross-section approach, although a few authors use panel data for their estimations (e.g. Eaton and 
Tamura 1994, Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004). Others relate FDI variations over time to changes in 
macroeconomic variables that show a high degree of volatility, especially exchange rates (Froot and 
Stein 1991, Blonigen 1997). It is the objective of this paper to combine these aspects within a unified 
approach. We start with a cross-section model that explains outward FDI using major country 
characteristics. Then a panel approach is developed in which exchange rates and stock market 
developments are utilised additionally as explanatory variables. It can be expected that the volatility of 
these determinants over time may contribute significantly to the explanation of foreign direct 
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investment across countries in a panel data setting. Appendix 1 suggests, too, that strong 
macroeconomic forces drive the timing of investment.  
The article is organised as follows. In a concise survey of the FDI literature, Section 2 elaborates how 
FDI is related to macroeconomic factors and how the relationship has been modelled in the literature. 
Our methodology is presented in Section 3. In the empirical analysis of Section 4, bilateral FDI and 
exports are modelled econometrically for the period 1991-2001 and for 22 OECD countries. Given the 
importance of the EU for changes in worldwide FDI, there is also an analysis of whether the 
determinants of FDI and exports are different from those in other countries. In Section 5, some major 
conclusions are drawn.  
2 FDI and its relation to macroeconomic factors 
Foreign direct investment mainly reflects long-term activities of multinational enterprises in order to 
establish a lasting interest in foreign markets (OECD 1996). A “useful way of thinking” about FDI 
(McCorriston 1999) is Dunning's Ownership-Location-Internalisation-Paradigm (OLI-Paradigm; see, 
for example, Dunning 1977). According to Dunning, a producer of goods has three options when it 
comes to serving a foreign market: he might export, he might license his production to independent 
firms abroad or he might establish his own subsidiaries in the target country. So, apart from the 
possibility of licensing, which is excluded here, the entrepreneur has to make a choice between trade 
and investment. Whereas it may seem that the most natural way to sell products abroad is to export 
them, FDI has become increasingly important. As trade and FDI are linked via a firm's choice of how 
to serve a foreign market, the question arises whether FDI is a substitute for trade or a complement of 
trade. Dunning argues that a firm will favour market access by FDI the more OLI advantages are 
available to be exploited. Ownership advantages encompass firm-specific advantages like patent rights, 
strong brands or superior management abilities. These factors are not bound to a specific location, and 
thus lead to scale economies. They render certain firms more competitive than potential (foreign) 
rivals. However, for fear of plagiarism, companies with strong ownership advantages are not willing to 
share their internal knowledge. Location advantages are pull factors that draw firms towards foreign 
shores. Reasons might be lower wages, easier access to raw materials, a favourable tax environment or 
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a necessary proximity to markets and consumers. Internalisation advantages relate to the reduction of 
possible transaction costs by overcoming principal-agent problems. Basically, FDI can be horizontal or 
vertical. Market-searching, horizontal FDI establishes production facilities or distribution networks in 
order to serve the target market from within the partner country. Vertical FDI shifts part of the 
production chain abroad in order to exploit differences in factor prices. In relation to trade in goods, it 
is often argued that horizontal FDI substitutes for exports while vertical FDI leads to increased trade 
with intermediate products (Kleinert and Klodt 2000, OECD 2002). It will not be possible in the 
approach presented here to directly address the question whether FDI and trade are substitutes or 
complements. The aggregation level is simply too high. However, evidence will be provided on 
whether trade and investment respond in a similar manner to a given set of explanatory variables. 
In the 1980s, the existence of multinational companies was integrated into international trade theory, 
most importantly by Helpman (1984), Helpman and Krugman (1985), and Markusen (1984). Whereas 
Helpman and Helpman/Krugman focused on the development of vertical multinationals via factor-
price differences between countries, Markusen was more interested in the rise of horizontal 
multinationals due to trade costs. A key assumption in both models was that, in contrast to national 
firms, potential multinationals are allowed to possess “headquarter services” (roughly in the sense of 
Dunning’s ownership advantages) that are modelled as fixed costs and can be exploited through plants 
at home or abroad at no extra cost. This leads to economies of scale, and thus an incentive to become 
multinational arises. Through the 1990s, Markusen adapted and extended his basic model with various 
co-authors. In particular, he tried to integrate the vertical Helpman/Krugman approach into his model 
of horizontal multinationals to create the “knowledge-capital” model. Its overall structure and key 
findings are nicely summarised in McCorriston (1999). Very condensed, the model states that in a two-
country world with a given level of trade costs (high enough to present a barrier to entry), there will be 
exclusively horizontal, “market-searching” FDI as long as the two countries are relatively similar in 
size (that is, GDP) and relatively endowed with skilled and unskilled labour. As differences in factor 
endowments emerge, there are growing incentives to undertake vertical FDI, culminating in a situation 
where headquarter services are concentrated in the country with abundant skilled labour and, in the 
other, production takes place with unskilled labour. With equal factor endowments but a growing 
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difference in country size, another corner solution arises: one market is so small that (with economies 
of scale) production there is unattractive; instead, all headquarter services and production are carried 
out in the large country, the small one being supplied through exports. Various mixed outcomes are 
possible. 
Apart from this trade theory approach, that explains investment flows using specific country 
characteristics, other strains of theory link FDI to certain volatile factors and shocks in the economy. In 
this context, is has to be borne in mind that the majority of observed FDI flows are caused by mergers 
and acquisitions rather than by green-field investment (UNCTAD 1997). Kleinert and Klodt (2000), for 
example, identify waves of mergers in the 1980s and 1990s for which they hold three interdependent 
factors responsible: general “globalisation”, deregulation and consolidation. 
Deregulation of formerly state-controlled sectors in many western industrialised countries was surely 
an important trigger for mergers and sector consolidation. State protection and subsidies were reduced 
in shrinking sectors like coal and steel in Europe or the US military industry after the end of the Cold 
War. On the other hand, deregulation such as the removal of entry-barriers led to the appearance of 
new players and the subsequent crowding out of others in, for example, telecommunications, finance 
and the airline carrier industry (Kleinert and Klodt 2000, p. 48). Together with technical progress in the 
computer industry and telecommunications (think of mobile phones or the internet), deregulation in 
turn fostered globalisation, which in this context stands for a general reduction of “distance costs”, that 
encompass trade costs as well as investment costs and costs for communication. With rather less 
certainty, one could also argue that globalisation led to a more acute perception of investment 
possibilities. It has already been noted by Kindleberger (1969) that firms tend to show a certain kind of 
myopia with regard to their geographical horizon. 
Along with deregulation one might also point to integration, since its manifestations in the forming of 
the EU single market in 1993, its enlargement in 1994 and 2004 and the introduction of a single 
currency should have facilitated intra-European investment enormously. European integration did 
indeed contribute to foreign direct investment by EU countries during the period 1997-2001. Such 
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effects could be included in an empirical model by using dummy variables or by utilising structural 
variables of the new member countries if the data were available. 
In addition, there is a possible connection between exchange rate fluctuations and FDI. This argument 
was presented by Froot and Stein (1991), who showed that Japanese FDI into the United States 
followed surprisingly close movements of the yen-dollar exchange rates in the 1980s. They explained 
this observation in terms of imperfect capital markets in which lenders with imperfect information tend 
to charge premiums on credits. However, holders of the appreciating currency experience wealth gains 
that allow them to finance more of an investment internally instead of relying heavily on expensive 
credit markets. 
Blonigen (1997) follows a different line of argument. In his view, foreign investors who do their 
calculations in the appreciating currency are prepared to make higher bids than national competitors for 
a possible acquisition target because the potential gains in the form of new, intangible assets (i.e. 
ownership advantages) are independent of the excha
affiliate sales (Brainard 1997, Carr et al. 2001). The gravity equation in its general form relates 
bilateral flows of goods or factors from country i to country j to income (Y), population (P) and country 
distance (D): 
(1)  Xij = ƒ (Yi, Yj, Pi, Pj, Dij). 
Originating in the work of Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhönen (1963), its somewhat intuitive econometric 
specification has been put on a solid foundation in economic theory especially by Linnemann (1966), 
Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989). One useful outcome of these derivations is that the 
gravity equation can be thought of as a reduced-form equation incorporating supply and demand 
factors of two countries. Helpman (1987) and Carr et al. (2001) use gravity equations to test 
implications that are derived from the general-equilibrium models of Krugman/Helpman and Markusen 
concerning the volume of trade or affiliate sales respectively. The new trade literature stresses two 
general conclusions. First, the bilateral trade volume between countries rises when total income grows 
and when country incomes converge. This effect is due to monopolistic competition and consumer 
preferences. Secondly, the trade volume also rises when factor endowments diverge because of 
Heckscher-Ohlin-type specialisation in production. Rising trade or distance costs should dampen trade. 
In the presence of multinational companies, the knowledge-capital approach expects analogous results 
for FDI activity and affiliate sales. Distance costs are an exception, since these are expected to 
influence multinational activity in more ways than one: some part of high distance costs might be 
attributed to high investment costs that should negatively influence FDI. Pure trade costs should 
positively affect horizontal direct investment as a substitute for trade. Vertical direct investment, 
however, is related to increased trade with intermediate products. Thus, it is posited that rising trade 
costs lower vertical FDI. In practice, of course, it is hard to separate horizontal from vertical FDI. The 
significance of variables controlling for relative factor endowments is sometimes taken as an indicator 
for the presence of vertical FDI (Hanson et al. 2003, Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004). In general, results 
from the empirical literature support the theory. The much-cited cross-section study of Brainard 
(1997), for example, shows that trade barriers, transport costs and scale economies at the management 
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level tend to increase the turnover of affiliate companies abroad. On the other hand, affiliate companies 
are less important in the presence of investment barriers and scale economies at the plant level. 
In practice, the gravity equation has been specified in different ways according to authors’ needs. 
Sometimes population is dropped as an explanatory variable, sometimes GDP per capita is used to 
capture factor-price differences, and sometimes only characteristics of the partner country are taken 
into account, and so on. This somewhat loose handling of variables may pose problems, as Baldwin 
and Taglioni (2006) rightly point out in a recent working paper. Here, in order to remain close to the 
knowledge-capital framework, we follow Carr et al. (2001) by taking gravity variables that account for 
the total market size of two countries, for differences in country size and for differences in skilled 
labour abundance, indices for trade and investment costs and country distance. In the cross-section 
estimation, dependent variables are FDI stocks (FDI) and exports (EX) respectively:  
(2)  FDIij, EXij = ƒ (GDPSUMij, GDPDIFFij, AGRDIFFij, DISTij, RISKi, RISKj, TREATYi, 
TREATYj, FREEi, FREEj, TAXj, HIFIj). 
Here, GDPSUM is the sum of both countries’ GDP, controlling for total market size. The expected sign 
is positive for both FDI and EX. GDPDIFF is an indicator of relative country size in terms of GDP 
measured as 1 – (GDPi/GDPSUMij)2 – (GDPj/GDPSUMij)2. Introduced by Helpman (1987), this term 
ranges from nearly 0 (high difference in country size) to 0.5 (both countries are of the same size). The 
expected sign of GDPDIFF is positive since convergence in country size should raise horizontal FDI 
and intra-industry trade. AGRDIFF should control for endowment differences in skilled labour; we 
take the difference in the share of the population in agriculture as a proxy1. The difference is expressed 
in absolute terms in order to keep observations strictly non-negative (see Blonigen et al. 2002). Since 
high endowment differences in skilled labour should encourage vertical FDI, a positive sign with 
regard to FDI is plausible. The expected sign in respect of EX is positive, too, because differences in 
factor endowments should foster inter-industry trade. DIST is the great-circle distance of country 
capitals. A negative influence of distance on trade flows (and more recently also on FDI) has been 
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reported in many cross-section studies (e.g. Buch et al. 2004, Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004). Variables 
controlling for the political environment, and thus transport and investment costs come next. In 
preference, one would use specific indicators like quality of infrastructure, red tape, degree of 
corruption, etc. in order to identify investment barriers. It is not hard to include these factors in a cross-
section study. However, in order to be able to expand the model later to a fixed-effects panel approach, 
it is preferable to take variables that show some degree of variation over time. Here, meta indices are 
used that are averages of several single political indicators. They do vary over time and have the 
additional advantage that they are relatively easy to obtain for many countries. 
RISK is an indicator of country risk, ranging from 0 to 100. High values indicate a low country risk. 
Therefore, its sign is expected to have a positive influence on investment and trade. TREATY is the 
total number of bilateral investment treaties each country has signed with other countries. It controls 
for investment liberalisation; its expected sign is positive for FDI and unspecified for EX. FREE is an 
index of economic freedom. It ranges from 1 to 5; higher values indicate less economic freedom. Thus, 
its expected sign is definitely negative for EX. As the index is comprised of costs for both trade and 
investment, its influence on FDI is ambiguous. It is only in the cross-section equations that the 
maximum corporate tax rate of the target country (TAX) and the degree of its job protection 
regulations (HIFI) are additionally included2. As high corporate taxes reduce profits, the influence of 
TAX on FDI is expected to be negative. HIFI ranges from 1 to 7, a higher value indicating fewer job 
protection measures. Since companies are thought to prefer flexible hiring rules, a positive influence of 
HIFI on FDI is likely. 
In a further step, the analysis is expanded to a fixed-effects panel model for the years 1991-2001. Here, 
the focus is on how changes of determinants influenced the level of investments and export activities 
over time. In order to check the relevance of relatively volatile macroeconomic factors, we additionally 
include a stock market indicator, exchange rates and price indices. These variables should account for 
                                                                                                                                                         
1 The share of the population in agriculture is unlikely to be an ideal indicator of unskilled labour. It would have been 
preferable to use data from the International Labour Organization (ILO) for skilled labour, as Carr et al. (2001) do. However, 
ILO data exhibit breaks in series within the period 1991-2001. 
2 Statistical tests with data from the sources indicated in Table 2 showed that these variables were not highly correlated with 
FREE – in contrast to many other political indicators.  
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possible relative wealth effects along the lines of Froot and Stein (1991), Blonigen (1997) and De 
Santis et al. (2004). Note that the stock market indicator is the only variable that has not yet been 
derived formally from a general-equilibrium framework: Bergstrand (1985, 1989) incorporates 
exchange rates and price indices in an empirical specification of the gravity equation in order to control 
for relative price effects. The dependent variable is first bilateral FDI flows and then bilateral exports. 
Thus, the panel specification is as follows: 
(3)  FDItij, EXtij = ƒ (GDPSUMtij, GDPDIFFtij, AGRDIFFtij, STOCKti, EXCHt$i, EXCHt$j, CPIti, CPItj, 
RISKti, RISKtj, TREATYti, TREATYtj, FREEti, FREEtj, DISTij·YDt). 
Annual bilateral FDI flows from country i to country j in period t, FDIijt, and annual bilateral exports, 
EXijt, are in 1995 US$. Again, they are explained by the same set of variables. In the following, indices 
are omitted for convenience. The variables that were already introduced in the cross-section estimation 
should now be interpreted with regard to changes over time; for example, GDPSUM now stands for 
market growth rather than a snapshot of market size. However, additional factors are introduced. 
STOCK is the yearly average of a leading stock market indicator in the reporting country, for example 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the USA or the DAX in Germany. As a bullish stock market is 
supposed to raise the relative wealth of the reporting country, STOCK should have a positive effect on 
FDI flows abroad. There are no predictions for its influence on exports. 
EXCH$ is the exchange rate of the reporting or partner countries’ currency in respect of the US-dollar. 
Appreciation of the reporting country’s currency presumably raises bilateral FDI because there is a 
relative wealth effect in favour of the reporting country. The opposite is true for exports: appreciation 
of the home country’s currency makes traded products in the partner country more expensive, thereby 
lowering import demand. As it can be assumed that many multinational enterprises calculate their 
overseas transactions in US-dollars, it is not the bilateral exchange rate that is used here. Appreciation 
of a country’s currency in respect of the US-dollar is reflected in a decrease of EXCH$. An increase in 
either EXCH$i or EXCH$j should raise FDI outflows from country i to country j, while it should lower 
corresponding exports. EXCH$ enters the equation in nominal terms. Instead of calculating the real 
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exchange rate, consumer price indices for the reporting and partner countries are included as separate 
terms, CPI. This is done in order to distinguish between external and internal price effects.  
3.2 Data 
In contrast to much prior research, which relied heavily on data for inward and/or outward FDI of the 
United States and occasionally other single countries, this study uses data of 22 reporting OECD 
countries in order to come to more universally applicable results (OECD 2003). This approach is 
especially interesting with regard to the relative importance that FDI by EU countries has gained in 
recent years. Countries included in the analysis are listed in Table 1. For the empirical estimation, an 
unbalanced panel data set is created for the period 1991-2001. This data set is split into two subsets: 
one for observations where both the donor and the recipient country are members of the current EU25 
and one for all other observations.  
Table 1: Countries included in the data set 
OECD countries reporting bilateral FDI outflows 
Australia Austria Belgium-Luxembourg Canada Denmark 
Finland France Germany Iceland Italy 
Japan Korea Netherlands New Zealand Norway 
Poland Portugal Spain Sweden Switzerland 
United Kingdom United States     
Destination countries 
All of the countries listed above, plus  
Algeria Argentina Baltic Countries Brazil Bulgaria 
Chile China Colombia Costa Rica Czech Republic 
Egypt Greece Hong Kong Hungary India 
Indonesia Iran Ireland Israel Malaysia 
Mexico Morocco Panama Philippines Romania 
Russia Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovak Republic Slovenia 
South Africa Thailand Turkey Ukraine United Arab Emirates 
Venezuela     
Source: Own compilation.  
In order to control for the validity of the panel model, a cross-section estimation for the year 1999 will 
be presented in the next section based on equation (2). The variables used and the data sources of all 
variables are summarized in Table 2.  
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 Table 2: Regression variables and where they come from 
Name  Source: 
FDI outflows Log of yearly outflows of foreign direct investment from 
country i to country j (in Mill US$). 
International direct investment statistics 
yearbook, OECD (2003). 
Exports Log of yearly exports from country i to country j (in Mill 
US$). 
Bilateral Trade Database, OECD 
(2004). 
GDPSUMijt Sum of GDP of reporting country i and partner country j in 
year t. Values are in logs. 
Calculated from data of the World 
Economic Outlook Database, 
International Monetary Fund (2004). 
GDPDIFFijt Indicator of relative country size in terms of GDP, measured as 
1 - (GDPi / GDPSUMij)2 - (GDPj / GDPSUMij)2;  
range between 0 (high difference in country size) and 0.5 
(countries are of same size). 
Calculated from data of the World 
Economic Outlook Database, 
International Monetary Fund (2004). 
AGRDIFFijt Absolute difference of shares of agricultural population in the 
reporting and partner country. 
Calculated from data of FAOSTAT. 
STOCKit Leading stock market indicator in reporting country i (in logs). World Federation of Exchanges (2004). 
EXCHit$, 
EXCHjt$ 
Nominal US$ exchange rate of the reporting country’s and 
partner country’s currency resp. A rising value indicates an 
appreciation of the dollar. 
Financial Statistics Yearbook, 
International Monetary Fund (2003). 
CPIit, CPIjt Consumer price index in the reporting and partner country 
resp.; base year 1995. 
World Investment Indicators Database, 
World Bank (2004). 
RISKit, RISKjt Country risk indicator for each country, ranging from 0-100. 
High values indicate a low country risk. 
World Investment Indicators Database, 
World Bank (2004). 
FREEit, FREEjt Index of economic freedoma, ranging from 1.0-5.0. High 
values indicate low economic freedom. 
Heritage Foundation (2005). 
TREATYit, 
TREATYjt 
Total number of bilateral investment treaties of the reporting 
and the partner country (not necessarily with each other). 
World Investment Report, UNCTAD 
(var.) 
TAXjt Top corporate income tax rate in the partner country. World Economic Forum (2003). 
HIFIjt Hiring and firing practices in the partner country.  World Economic Forum (2003). 
DISTij*YEARt Dummy variable combining the log of the great-circle distance 
of capitals with year dummies. Used in order to reveal 
changing influence of distance in a fixed-effects approach. 
Distance of capitals from Byers (1997). 
a Since this index only starts in 1995, the 1995 values are inserted for the years 1991-1994. This solution is second-best, but the alternatives 
would have been either to lose these observations or to omit the index. 
Source: Own compilation. 
4 Econometric results: The determinants of FDI and exports 
Based on the methodology and data outlined in Section 3, we now present the econometric results. 
Determinants of FDI and exports are identified across countries for 1999 and across countries over 
time, i.e. for 1991-2001.  
4.1 Determinants of FDI and exports across countries 
Results of the cross-section estimation with fully robust standard errors can be found in Table 3. The 
positive sign of the coefficient of GDPSUM shows that market size influences FDI stocks positively. 
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Bilateral investment also rises when the countries are of similar size (positive sign of the GDPDIFF 
coefficient). Countries tend to invest more in nearby than in distant countries (negative sign of the 
DIST coefficient). The significantly positive sign of the RISKi coefficient shows that companies in 
countries with high political and economic stability undertake more FDI than others. The latter result is 
somewhat surprising, as all reporting countries are OECD members and therefore stable economies. 
Moreover, FDI tends to grow in response to market openness of the reporting and the partner country. 
Within the EU, differences in market openness of the reporting countries have no significant influence 
on FDI in a European partner country. Given the high level of EU economic integration, this comes as 
no surprise. Still, openness of the partner country always promotes FDI, even between EU countries. 
Furthermore, the number of the reporting country’s bilateral investment agreements raises FDI stocks 
abroad. However, according to the results, neither a high corporate tax rate nor tight job protection 
measures significantly reduce a country’s attractiveness to foreign investors. Disappointingly, the 
variable that should reflect differences in skilled labour endowment, AGRDIFF, is not significant. As it 
is not plausible that differences in labour availability are not at least partially responsible for 
international direct investment, AGRDIFF does not seem to be a satisfying proxy variable for labour 
endowment. The correction of this shortcoming must be left to further research. 
With exports as a dependent variable, the results are similar. Market size and relative country size 
promote exports to the target country, too. On the other hand, the greater the distance between two 
countries, the less they are going to trade with each other. Overall, political indicators are significant 
with the expected sign. However, they tend to be less significant for the EU area than for all other 
observations. This is arguably due to the introduction of the Single Market and the eradication of trade 
barriers between member states. The significant and negative influence of HIFI on intra-EU exports is 
surprising. The variable is probably a proxy for an additional influence outside the model. Summing 
up, the distribution of FDI stocks and exports is explained by country differences in a similar way. This 
result points to a complementary relationship of FDI and trade rather than a substitutive one. 
Differentiating between the EU area and the rest of the world, the disparities in the political framework 
are more pronounced if countries outside the European Community are involved. 
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Table 3: Cross-section estimation for bilateral FDI stocks and exports 1999 
 Regression with fully robust standard errors 
 Dependent variable: bilateral FDI stocks Dependent variable: bilateral exports 
 Intra-EU25 investment Other investment Intra-EU25 exports Other trade 
 Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE Coef.  SE 
GDPSUM 1.607 *** 0.478 1.748 *** 0.092 1.776 *** 0.175 1.831 *** 0.056 
GDPDIFF 2.615 ** 1.289 5.141 *** 0.606 3.458 *** 0.484 5.323 *** 0.362 
AGRDIFF -1.598  2.911 -0.228  0.635 0.215  0.973 0.060  0.333 
DISTij -1.641 *** 0.202 -0.658 *** 0.111 -1.068 *** 0.095 -0.951 *** 0.054 
RISKi 0.457 *** 0.041 0.249 *** 0.036 0.073 *** 0.014 0.051 *** 0.012 
RISKj 0.013  0.036 0.002  0.012 0.028 ** 0.014 0.013 ** 0.005 
FREEi 0.925  0.663 -1.570 *** 0.526 -0.419 * 0.234 -1.025 *** 0.194 
FREEj -1.142 ** 0.550 -1.327 *** 0.235 -0.428 ** 0.217 -1.082 *** 0.109 
TREATYi 0.017 ** 0.008 0.016 *** 0.002 0.004  0.003 0.010 *** 0.001 
TREATYj -0.007  0.008 0.001  0.003 0.000  0.003 -0.003 ** 0.002 
TAXj -0.008  0.024 -0.025  0.016 0.004  0.008 -0.002  0.008 
HIFIj -0.202  0.164 -0.007  0.092 -0.178 *** 0.051 -0.041  0.045 
CONS -31.822 *** 6.977 -16.978 *** 4.315 2.634  2.795 6.064 *** 1.711 
N 204 512 247 894 
F-Test F(12; 191) 36.70 F(12; 499) 70.33 F(12; 234) 120.99 F(12; 881) 188.33 
R²   0.70   0.60   0.87   0.76 
R² (adj.)   0.68   0.59   0.86   0.75 
***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels. 
Source: Own computations.  
 
4.2 Panel specification of the years 1991-2001 
The panel-model approach allows many more observations to be used, but it also yields econometric 
problems with regard to the distance variable in the gravity equation. A fixed-effects regression does 
not permit the estimation of parameter coefficients. Parameters are absorbed within the group effects. 
A random-effects specification would allow for parameter coefficients to be estimated but necessitates 
the assumption that the group effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables. A Hausman test 
indicates that the random-effects method is not appropriate in our case. As geographic country distance 
remains unchanged over time, DIST cannot be introduced in the panel model as a single variable. 
Instead DIST is made to interact with t year dummy variables. This approach enables us to capture the 
changing influence of DIST on the dependent variable over time compared with the base period 
(Wooldridge 2003, p. 428).  
Results are obtained by fixed-effects estimation. Fully robust standard errors are used that correct for 
heteroskedasticity and, additionally, for possible autocorrelation within panel groups. Results for the 
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FDI equations are shown in Table 4. Apparently, total market size is the dominating force driving FDI 
for all groups of observations with coefficients well above unity. An elastic relationship is implied in 
this case. Relative country size is not significant either for EU25 observations or observations with 
non-EU countries3. Differences in the proportion of the population in agriculture, again used as a proxy 
for differences in human capital endowment, do not influence FDI flows significantly over time either. 
On the other hand, stock market developments in the donor country are highly significant for 
investment that took place in non-EU25 countries by EU25 countries and vice versa. Stock market 
developments in EU donor countries, however, did not lead these countries to invest more in other 
EU25 countries. 
US-dollar exchange rate fluctuations relative to the reporting country’s currency are highly significant 
as long as we do not focus exclusively on intra-EU25 investment. Appreciation of the US-dollar 
relative to the reporting country’s currency raises FDI in the partner country, while changes in the 
exchange rates of the partner countries have no effect. Within the EU25 area, the exchange rate of the 
reporting country’s currency with the US-dollar has no significant effect on direct investment. The 
partner country’s exchange rate, however, does have an effect which is significant at the 10% level. 
Here, a negative sign implies that depreciation of the dollar relative to the partner country’s currency 
raises FDI. 
Inflation in the reporting country has a significantly negative influence on FDI if investment does not 
take place between EU25 members. On the other hand, inflation in the partner country has a 
significantly positive influence on FDI flows for both country groups. 
Most indicators controlling for political influences were statistically significant in the cross-country 
regressions. This no longer holds in the panel estimations. Although they are not parameters, these 
variables show relatively little variation over time. It is likely that differences between countries do 
influence FDI, but within the panel model they are captured in the fixed country effects. However, an 
increase in the number of bilateral investment treaties of the reporting country significantly raises all 
                                                 
3 Changes in relative country size are significant when the two subsets are merged; however, as they seem to be very different 
from each other, it might not be appropriate to do so. 
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other FDI flows significantly. Within the EU25 area, changes in the number of investment treaties do 
not influence FDI. An explanation might be the possible irrelevance of third-country treaties for intra-
EU investment4.  
It is striking that the influence of distance on FDI did change. It became more negative over the sample 
period. The interaction terms are moderately to highly significant for intra-EU25 investment; for other 
investment, however, they are only significant for 20015. Buch et al. (2004) stress that the coefficient 
of the distance variable does not measure distance costs per se. A negative sign should rather be 
interpreted as a tendency to maintain closer economic relations with neighbouring countries than with 
countries far away. Thus, these results state a tendency over the nineties to conduct relatively less FDI 
in distant countries. Significantly negative distance coefficients within the EU25 area for the years 
1993-1998 indicate a concentration of investment flows in the EU15 area. 
Comparing these results with those for the export equations in Table 4, we see immediately that, in 
respect of the within-component, the gravity equation for intra-EU25 observations “fits” much better 
for exports than it does for FDI: over the period in question, the same variables explain 22% of the 
within-group variation of FDI flows but 68% of the variation of exports. Market size is also significant 
for explaining exports in both country groups, as is relative country size. The difference in the share of 
the population in agriculture is significant for trade flows only within the EU25 area. Stock market 
developments do not influence exports. This indicates one important deviation from the results for FDI. 
The influence of exchange rates also differs. As expected, appreciations of the US-dollar relative to the 
partner country’s currency reduce exports to the partner country. However, exchange rate changes of 
the reporting country’s currency are only significant for observations within the EU25 area. Here, a 
depreciation of the reporting country’s currency relative to the US-dollar significantly raises exports, 
while such changes do not influence observations for “other trade”. As in the case of FDI, an increase 
in the price level of the partner country raises exports. Price increases in the reporting country 
                                                 
4 However, if standard errors need not account for possible autocorrelation, the coefficient of TREATIESj becomes 
significantly positive. This result is not reported in Table 4. Bilateral investment treaties CEEC countries established prior to 
their EU accession might have raised EU-FDI into the new member states. 
5 However, as with relative market size, the distance terms are highly significant and negative when the two data subsets are 
merged. This finding supports the observation that FDI activity flourished between (future) EU countries and only stresses the 
need to differentiate between the EU25-area and other investment. 
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significantly lower exports in all country groups. 
Table 4: Fixed-effects panel estimation for bilateral FDI flows and exports 1991-2001 
 Regression with fully robust standard errors 
 Dependent variable: bilateral FDI outflows Dependent variable: bilateral exports 
 Intra-EU25 investment Other investment Intra-EU25 exports Other trade 
 Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE Coef.   SE 
GDPSUM 5.174 *** 1.563 2.476 *** 0.705 0.598 * 0.334 1.724 *** 0.286 
GDPDIFF 9.764  6.639 3.354  2.493 2.808 ** 1.164 3.468 *** 0.985 
AGRDIFF 5.081  10.952 2.862  3.981 5.711 ** 2.258 -0.115  1.094 
STOCKi 0.215   0.181 0.480 *** 0.090 -0.021   0.031 -0.001   0.028 
EXCH$i 0.869  0.573 0.910 *** 0.299 0.202 ** 0.094 0.064  0.074 
EXCH$j -0.962 * 0.532 0.005  0.085 -0.436 *** 0.113 -0.069 *** 0.026 
CPIi -0.355  0.851 -3.549 *** 0.771 -0.543 *** 0.140 -0.517 ** 0.213 
CPIj 1.085 ** 0.513 0.163 *** 0.051 0.896 *** 0.109 0.123 *** 0.019 
RISKi -0.009   0.019 -0.004   0.010 0.003   0.002 0.003   0.002 
RISKj 0.011  0.013 0.010  0.007 0.001  0.002 0.012 *** 0.002 
FREEi 0.410  0.399 0.075  0.352 0.064  0.063 -0.069  0.077 
FREEj 0.312  0.296 -0.303  0.211 0.004  0.058 -0.249 *** 0.064 
TREATYi -0.006  0.008 0.016 *** 0.004 -0.003 ** 0.001 0.001  0.001 
TREATYj 0.011  0.008 0.000  0.004 -0.005 *** 0.001 0.000  0.001 
DIST*1992 -0.018   0.022 0.005   0.011 0.002   0.003 -0.004   0.003 
DIST*1993 -0.059 ** 0.029 -0.018  0.014 -0.010 * 0.005 -0.012 *** 0.003 
DIST*1994 -0.096 ** 0.043 0.000  0.016 0.004  0.008 -0.016 *** 0.005 
DIST*1995 -0.116 ** 0.057 0.000  0.021 0.030 *** 0.011 -0.010  0.007 
DIST*1996 -0.162 ** 0.068 -0.006  0.026 0.034 ** 0.014 -0.021 *** 0.008 
DIST*1997 -0.178 ** 0.082 -0.025  0.028 0.041 ** 0.018 -0.024 ** 0.010 
DIST*1998 -0.162 * 0.095 -0.017  0.031 0.049 ** 0.021 -0.036 *** 0.010 
DIST*1999 -0.165  0.108 -0.046  0.034 0.052 ** 0.024 -0.050 *** 0.012 
DIST*2000 -0.149  0.121 -0.057  0.038 0.050 * 0.026 -0.056 *** 0.013 
DIST*2001 -0.208  0.131 -0.089 ** 0.041 0.054 * 0.029 -0.068 *** 0.015 
CONS -39.445 *** 9.380 -4.761   6.148 -1.463   2.181 -7.298 ** 2.851 
N 1833 4386 1833 4386 
Groups 265 737 265 737 
F-Test F(23; 1544)  F(23; 3625) F(23; 1544) F(23; 3625) 
      11.51     18.35     29.61     26.78 
R² (within)    0.22    0.18    0.68    0.28 
R² 
(incl.FE,adj.)   0.80   0.80   0.99   0.98 
Root MSE     1.10     1.11     0.13     0.26 
***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5% and 10%-levels. 
Source: Own computations.  
Low country risk of the partner country affects all other bilateral exports positively, but bilateral 
investment treaties have no effect on trade in this subset. Interestingly, however, TREATIES is 
significantly negative for intra-EU25 trade in respect of the reporting and the partner countries. This 
might be an indication of a substitution effect between investment and trade between countries in the 
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EU25 area. Rising economic freedom in the partner country is significantly associated with rising 
exports to that country except for intra-EU25 trade. 
The annual distance variables are negative and highly significant for nearly all years when estimated 
for trade with non-EU25 countries. However, for intra-EU25 trade they are significantly positive for 
the period 1995-2000. This is a highly unusual result. Thus, while there has been a worldwide tendency 
to trade more with less distant countries, this trend was reversed within the EU25 area and relatively 
more trade has been directed to the periphery. 
5 Conclusions 
The aim of this paper is to elaborate the factors that led to the major increase in worldwide foreign 
direct investment during the 1990s. A further objective is to assess whether there was a differential 
impact of these determinants on FDI and exports. Therefore, gravity models for bilateral FDI and 
exports of OECD countries as reporting countries are estimated, first in a cross-section setting for 1999 
and then with a panel data set over the years 1991-2001. Explanatory variables are adopted from new 
trade theory and the knowledge-capital approach of multinational enterprises. The results support the 
notion that horizontal FDI is more common than vertical FDI, since an increase in total market size 
proves to be a very significant promoter of FDI, while skills differences as proxied by differences in 
the share of the population in agriculture do not. This is consistent with Blonigen et al. (2002), who 
could not establish a relationship between skills differences and FDI either.  
Some important factors can be identified that do not affect FDI and exports in the same manner. Stock 
market booms increased all other FDI flows, while exports were generally not influenced by stock 
market variations. Furthermore, changed assessment of political risk or economic freedom in a country 
had marked effects on exports, while they left outward FDI more or less unchanged. This result may be 
due to the fact that import demand is reduced in countries that are relatively unstable politically or 
insulated by high trade barriers, while FDI might be more affected by push factors regarding ownership 
advantages of multinational firms. The latter factor could not be explicitly controlled for within the 
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available data set. However, investment liberalisation significantly encouraged FDI, while there is 
some evidence to suggest that it might have reduced exports within the EU25 area. 
Exchange rate fluctuations of reporting and partner countries’ currencies relative to the US-dollar did 
have a differential influence on FDI and exports. In the case of FDI, appreciation of the dollar relative 
to the reporting country’s currency raised outward FDI. This relationship does not directly support a 
relative wealth hypothesis along the lines of Froot and Stein. Rather it suggests that (US-dollar based) 
foreign direct investment becomes more attractive the more there is to lose by doing business in one’s 
domestic currency. Exports, however, are raised by depreciation of the dollar relative to the partner 
country’s currency. This is further evidence that exports are influenced more heavily by demand 
factors of the partner country, while FDI is driven by supply factors of the reporting country. 
Price increases in the partner country raise FDI and exports in all country groups, while price increases 
in the reporting country lower exports significantly. They also lower all other FDI flows, but not intra-
EU25 investment. 
OECD countries tended to boost economic integration with neighbouring economies rather than with 
countries far away. Within the EU25 area, the reverse is true for exports, indicating growing trade with 
peripheral countries. To a lesser extent, this holds for FDI, too. After accession talks with potential new 
member states had become relevant, EU investment began to flow east, rendering the negative distance 
terms within the EU25 area insignificant. This evidence may support the view that the globalisation 
phenomenon is in reality ongoing regionalisation.  
In summary, the results support general theories of horizontal foreign direct investment and should 
encourage further research in this area, especially with regard to sector-specific effects which could not 
be controlled for here. 
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6 Appendix 
Appendix 1: Development of worldwide FDI flows according to the region of origin 
 
Source: Own presentation with data from UNCTAD. 
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